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Conditions	 No	Evidence	 Basic	 Plus	 Marble	
Mean	 SD	 Mean	 SD	 Mean	 SD	 Mean	 SD	
Coin	(Study	1,	n	=	241)	 3.83	 .78	 3.98	 1.05	 4.40	 1.15	 4.87	 1.60	
Pill	(Study	2,	n	=	237)	 3.92	 1.04	 3.90	 1.28	 4.23	 1.71	 4.82	 1.54	





































































NO 	EV I D EN C E B AS I C P L U S MAR B L E
M
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Coin	(Study	1,	n	=	241) Pill	(Study	2,	n=	237) Combined	(Study	1&2,	n	=	478)
	
	
Discussion	
Our	results	show	that	experimentally	observed	reasoning	in	the	SBP	does	not	simply	fit	either	the	
halfer	or	the	thirder	analyses.	The	halfer’s	analysis	is	consistent	with	the	lack	of	a	significant	
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difference	between	the	Basic	and	No	Evidence	conditions,	but	is	at	odds	with	the	finding	that	the	
Plus	and	Basic	conditions	reliably	differed	(recall	that	for	the	halfer	one	should	have	P(Tails)	=	1/2	
in	both	cases).	The	thirder’s	analysis,	on	the	other	hand,	is	consistent	with	the	latter	result,	but	is	
inconsistent	with	the	finding	that	the	probability	of	Tails	is	reliably	judged	to	be	higher	in	the	
Marble	than	in	the	Plus	condition	(for	the	thirder,	one	should	have	P(Tails)	=	5/6	in	both	cases).	
Because	in	some	of	the	conditions	the	variance	was	relatively	high,	we	examined	whether	we	
could	distinguish	a	group	of	halfers	and	a	group	of	thirders	among	the	participants.	If	our	
participants	actually	included	these	two	groups,	then	the	pattern	of	responses	across	critical	
conditions	like	Basic	and	Plus	should	be	bimodally	distributed.	However,	we	did	not	find	
indications	of	a	bimodal	distribution	in	any	of	the	conditions.	
Furthermore,	our	results	seem	to	rule	out	the	possibility	that	differences	in	how	people	reason	
about	SB	do	not	depend	on	differences	in	how	they	treat	self-locating	information,	but	instead	
depend	on	different	people	having	differing	models	for	the	type	of	evidence	that	SB	will	observe	
(cf.	Cisewski	et	al.	2016).	If	the	significant	difference	that	we	found	between	the	Basic	and	Plus	
conditions	only	depended	on	the	presence	of	one	group	of	halfers	and	one	group	of	thirders	
among	our	participants,	who	would	have	differing	models	for	the	type	of	evidence	that	SP	will	
observe,	then	the	variance	of	the	responses	in	the	Plus	condition	should	be	higher	than	the	
variance	in	the	Basic	condition.	After	all,	halfers	should	respond	1/2	in	both	conditions,	while	
thirders	should	respond	2/3	in	Basic	and	5/6	in	Plus.	However,	if	there	are	actually	two	groups	
among	our	participants,	then	the	variance	in	the	Plus	condition	should	also	be	systematically	
higher	than	the	variance	of	the	responses	in	the	Marble	condition,	because,	in	this	latter	
condition,	both	halfers	and	thirders	agree	on	the	5/6	response.	Yet	again,	this	is	not	what	we	
found:	the	variance	of	participants’	responses	did	not	systematically	increase	from	the	Marble	to	
the	Plus	conditions.	So,	the	hypothesis	that	our	participants	included	a	group	of	halfers	and	a	
group	of	thirders	does	not	seem	to	account	for	our	results.			
Given	that	no	standard	theoretical	analysis	accounts	for	observed	behavior,	one	might	be	tempted	
to	complement	a	thirder	framework	with	an	appeal	to	cognitive	limitations	akin	to	those	arising	in	
other	known	puzzles	of	probabilistic	reasoning.	In	particular,	from	a	thirder’s	perspective,	the	SBP	
may	seem	structurally	similar	to	the	Monty	Hall	problem.	And	Monty	Hall	is	known	to	invite	1/2	as	
a	largely	dominant	response	because	of	the	representational	and	computational	difficulty	of	the	
task	for	the	unaided	human	mind	(Krauss	&	Wang,	2003).	Although	appealing,	this	remark	is	not	
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sufficient	to	explain	our	results	either.	After	all,	thirders	could	easily	see	that	the	Marble	and	the	
Plus	variants	have	the	same	mathematical	structure,	with	the	number	of	marbles	corresponding	to	
the	number	of	awakenings;	and	so,	they	will	provide	similar	judgments	in	both	variants.	However,	
this	is	not	what	we	found.	Our	participants’	judgments	differed	significantly	across	the	Marble	and	
Plus	condition,	which	suggests	that	our	findings	cannot	simply	be	explained	in	terms	of	
representational	difficulty	of	the	task	like	in	the	Monty	Hall	problem.	
A	thirder	would	also	be	unable	to	explain	our	results	by	relying	solely	on	a	general	tendency	to	
conservatism	in	probability	updating,	according	to	which	people’s	belief	updating	is	generally	
conservative	relative	to	the	predictions	of	Bayesian	conditioning	(Phillips	&	Edwards	1966;	
Edwards	1968;	Fischoff	&	Beyth-Marom,	1983;	Slovic	&	Lichtenstein,	1972).	The	provision	of	new	
evidence	would	then	have	less	impact	on	people’s	belief	updating	than	what	Bayesian	
conditioning	predicts.	But	this	general	tendency	to	conservativism	in	probability	updating	still	does	
not	explain	the	difference	we	found	between	judgments	in	the	Marble	and	Plus	conditions,	which	
were	structurally	analogous	from	a	general	probabilistic	point	of	view.	
Consistent	with	our	results	is	instead	the	explanation	that	people	show	a	tendency	to	
conservativism	in	specific	settings,	only	with	respect	to	specific	kinds	of	evidence.	The	idea	is	that	
our	participants	extracted	less	certainty	from	the	available	self-locating	evidence	in	comparison	to	
the	“observed”	evidence	of	the	marble	in	a	randomly	chosen	box.	This	conservativism	in	belief	
updating	with	self-locating	information	can	be	further	explained	in	a	number	of	ways	(cf.,	Edwards	
1968).	Participants	could	have	mis-perceived	the	true	evidential	impact	of	self-locating	
information,	discounting	its	weight	more	than	“observed”	evidence.	Or,	although	the	weight	of	
self-locating	information	was	perceived	in	a	similar	way	as	the	weight	of	non-self-locating	
information,	participants	might	have	applied	an	adjusted	combination	rule	to	self-locating	
information	when	revising	their	beliefs.	
Source	reliability	provides	another	factor	that	can	explain	our	results	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	
with	Bayesian	belief	update.	As	Corner,	Harris	&	Hahn	(2010)	suggest,	in	situations	where	
information	is	received	from	some	source,	people	should	not	update	their	beliefs	as	much	as	if	
they	had	directly	observed	the	evidence.	This	is	because	it	is	rare	that	people	receive	information	
from	sources	that	are	fully	reliable;	and	it	is	even	more	rare	that	people	produce	themselves	fully	
reliable	information,	on	which	they	update	their	beliefs.	Consequently,	self-locating	information	
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produced	by	oneself	could	be	diluted	to	some	degree,	in	line	with	a	Bayesian	analysis	of	source	
reliability	(Corner	et	al.	2010).	
In	summary,	our	results	are	consistent	with	a	pattern	of	judgment	that	is	qualitatively	different	
from	either	the	halfer	or	thirder	analyses,	where	self-locating	evidence	is	acknowledged	as	
relevant	but	its	quantitative	impact	is	discounted	significantly	as	compared	to	more	standard	
statistical	evidence.	Other	factors	were	previously	shown	to	have	such	diluting	effects	on	
reasoning	with	evidence,	such	as	second-order	uncertainty	about	the	values	of	a	relevant	
statistical	distribution	(Tentori,	Crupi,	&	Osherson,	2010).	Although	“mixed”	models	of	the	SBP	
exist	(Bostrom,	2007;	Meacham	2008),	they	do	not	take	into	account	this	particular	diluting,	
conservative	effect	involved	in	reasoning	with	self-locating	information.	Our	results	will	then	
contribute	to	put	analyses	of	the	SBP,	and	more	generally	of	probabilistic	reasoning	with	self-
locating	information,	on	plausible	descriptive	grounds.	
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